#Al-Maliki - #Al-Sadr: The real controversy! #Iraq crisis #usa

The developments in Iraq in recent years revolve around the rhythm of the conflict that is taking place between Shiite political currents.

Although the political process since 2003 has been based on a Shiite-Sunni-Kurdish triumvirate, all political movement is based unambiguously around the backbone of Shiite politics and the compass that determines its directions.

Nhlt political Shi'ite nervousness of two factors.

The first factor is religious. It draws its dynamics from the Shiite jurisprudential, historical and political heritage, and moves based on the “marja’iya,” even if the site is confused between the traditional one in Najaf and the current political one in Qom.

The second factor is political, based on “injustice” whose truth has long been promoted until it reached the level of self-evidentity. It draws on a discourse that confines the sufferings of Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship to the Shiites alone, marginalizing large sectarian, national and political segments of which tyranny has been subjected to, and has continued to suppress and beat them because of their opposition, as well as the Shiite opposition. the ruling regime in Baghdad.

But two other factors, external this time, contributed to establishing the political process on the basis of the Shiite reservoir, especially that represented by Shiite political Islam.

The first is the clear American support for the “Shi’ite option” since Washington sponsored a series of opposition conferences in many cities in the world years before the 2003 invasion. This choice was also based on an American school of thought popularized after “September 11” that sees the Shiites as an ally and the Sunnis as a threat. Strategically, al-Qaeda was nothing but a front for it. It is true that Iraqi opposition factions and components of multiple identities were involved in these conferences, but Washington (and London as well) invested radically in supporting political Shiism and making it the first pillar of change in Iraq.

Second, Iran's excessive, extensive and comprehensive involvement in controlling the political process in Iraq, and dominating all its components within all sects and nationalities. Tehran was not satisfied with supporting its allies and followers, but also worked, with security, money, jurisprudence, and the military, to make the religious Shiite parties a close extension of the Islamic Republic and the guide in Tehran.

However, the Shiite political parties, with the religious and civil aspects, which are supposed to be multiple, competing, and contradictory, found two main interfaces for unity, overcoming contradictions and marginalizing differences.

The first aspect is confronting the rule of the Baath Party and being careful not to allow the possibility of any return to the party that was overthrown by the 2003 invasion, and to prevent any possible infiltration of it into the new political process into the new political system.

Although the rule of Iraq has become major international and internal interests that impose on politicians the logic of contention over positions and allotment, the obsession with the “resurrection of the Baath” remained a real fear, which they claim or see as realistic as possible, until the matter reached the point of obsession and they established all the tools, laws and measures to combat it Foundation "Eradication".

The second interface, not far from the first and perhaps a congenital one, relates to the emergence of ISIS in 2014.

The "disaster" prompted the Shiite political elites to bypass any dispute, including bypassing the responsibility of Nuri al-Maliki and his government at the time for what happened, and all Shiite political components began to ally and unite to respond to the terrorist threat, whether in his alleged Sunni identity or in the symptoms it represented by "resurrection of the Baath" with tools Letters and other texts. And all Shiite components went to cover themselves with the mantle of reference in Najaf, in the person of Sayyid Ali al-Sistani, and take cover with his famous fatwa on "sufficient jihad" in June 2014, which legalized Shiites to establish the "Popular Mobilization."

However, the avoidance of dangers from the political existence of Shiites has restored the Shiites in Iraq with a vitality of multiple natures. There is no dispute that the "October revolution" in Iraq since 2019, which united its cities, regions and all social segments, is Shiite in origin and substance that expresses Shiite social anger that joined the grievances expressed by other Iraqi segments years ago.

And the “revolution” in this context is a Shiite against the domination exercised by Shiite politicians over power, to the extent that the street among other sects refrained or reserved any participation in the activities of that movement for fear that sectarian sensitivities would distort its messages, and lose its Shiite character, which has become a condition for ridding Iraq of his crisis.

Accordingly, the Iraqi crisis these days is a chore revolving around a Shiite-Shiite conflict in which the two Sunni-Kurdish components are affected and not affected by it.

And if Iran's influence within the Iraqi street, according to what was shown by the "October Revolution", was fractured to the extent that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei saw only "riots run by America, Israel and some countries in the region", Tehran still has influence over political Shiites in Iraq, although This influence is almost complete with the currents affiliated with the "coordinating framework" and loses much of its luster among other Shiite parties, especially what is represented by Muqtada al-Sadr and his current among the Shiites of Iraq.

At the heart of the debate within the "Shiite House," the debate touches on the role and function of Iran. Leaks of Dawa Party leader Nuri al-Maliki reveal a call for more Shiite loyalty to Iran, specifically to the Revolutionary Guards there. Al-Sadr's supporters chant inside the Green Zone, "Iran out, out, out", just as the Shi'ites chanted the Cherryans years ago.
The situation is that the "Shiite debate" is required to address the crisis of governance and the system's bug in Iraq.

Tehran deals with its Shiites in Iraq through Ismail Qaani, commander of the Quds Force, in the Iranian revolutionary event. He enters Iraq as he wanders in any Iranian province. If al-Sadr, who is a friend of Iran, represents an attempt to build an independent Iraqi state, albeit formally and relative to Tehran's decision, then Iran is keen not to lose its Iraqi presence, and is keen that the country does not enjoy this gain as long as the country is a key card of Iran's deliberations. Tehran with the region and the world.

 

In fact, the perpetuation of Iran's influence in Iraq requires the survival of the Iraqi Shiites' sense of fear. Despite the disappearance of the rule of the Baath two decades ago and the hegemony of the political Shiites and their allies over the state and its institutions, the leaks attributed to the owners reveal the extent to which they continue to market fear to the Shiites of a return, and make their only salvation is loyalty and loyalty as an existential, jurisprudential option, almost a "Husseini", to stick Iran, its guards, and its guardian al-faqih.